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Civil Commitment in California: A
Defense Perspective on the Operation of
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act
By ALAN W. TIEGER*
and
MICHAEL A. KRESSER**
The implementation of California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act'
represented a major attempt by the state legislature to strike a balance
between various libertarian, therapeutic, and public welfare concerns
generated by involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill. The act
has sparked considerable initial interest and has prompted academic
comment. 2
In this article, we examine the application of the Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act (LPS) during the first seven years of its operation,
with special emphasis on its operation in Santa Clara County. Because
our observations come from the perspective of a patient's advocate, 3 the
* B.A., 1972, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1975, University of
Santa Clara School of Law. Member of the California Bar. Deputy Public Defender,
Santa Clara County.
** B.A., 1971, Miami University; J.D., 1975, Stanford University School of Law.
Member of the California Bar. Deputy Public Defender, Santa Clara County.
1. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5400 (West 1972 & Supp. 1977).
2. See, e.g., Comment, California's New Mental Commitment Legislation - Is It
Legally Sufficient?, 6 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 146 (1969); Note, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill in California: the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 7 LOYOLA L. REv. (Los
ANGELES) 93 (1974); Comment, Compulsory Counsel for California's New Mental
Health Law, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 851 (1970).
3. The authors are deputy public defenders in Santa Clara County. The public
defender is appointed to represent the involuntarily committed in Santa Clara County.
Indeed, the Office of the Public Defender handles virtually all litigation on behalf of
involuntarily committed patients. Representation of such patients by private counsel in
Santa Clara County is rare. See Statement of Nordin P. Blacker, private attorney and
Deputy Magistrate of the Federal District Court, San Jose Annex of the San Francisco
district, quoted by Ellanson, Administration of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act in Santa
Clara County, Aug. 1975 (unpublished thesis on file with the authors) [hereinafter cited
as Ellanson].
It should be noted that some of the assertions in the text come from the authors'
personal experience as public defenders.
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article will focus principally upon the act's impact on the civil liberties
of the allegedly mentally ill. We will trace the LPS framework in de-
tail, seeking to highlight those elements of the act which provide crucial
leverage for the patient's attorney as well as those which frustrate advo-
cacy and protection of the patient's rights.
An Overview of the Act
In brief, the act provides for an initial involuntary detention period
of seventy-two hours at an approved detention facility for a person
thought to be a danger to others, a danger to himself, or gravely dis-
abled as a result of mental disorder or inebriation. 4 This initial holding
period is unique among all stages of the act insofar as no statutory pro-
vision is made for judicial review or appointment of counsel.
Upon expiration of the seventy-two hour period, the patient may
be "certified" for an additional period of detention not to exceed four-
teen days.' Again, the basis for confinement is the allegation that the
patient is either a danger to self, to others, or is gravely disabled.6 Dur-
ing this time, the patient may request a writ of habeas corpus 7 and has
the right to be represented by counsel8 at a hearing to determine the
merits of his petition.
After the fourteen day certification period, there are three statu-
tory provisions for extending involuntary confinement. First, the act
provides for a ninety day "postcertification hold" for a patient considered
to be imminently dangerous.' A filing by the state of a postcertifica-
tion petition triggers a mandatory hearing. 10 Upon such a filing the
patient has the right to demand a jury trial." At either the hearing
or the trial the patient must be found to have either threatened, at-
tempted, or actually inflicted physical harm during the course of the
earlier hospitalization or to have been admitted to the hospital because
of such an act.' 2
Second, LPS provides a fourteen day "recertification" procedure,
involving the same statutory features as the original certification proce-
4. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5150, 5170 (West Supp. 1977).
5. Id. § 5250 (West 1972).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 5275.
8. Id. § 5276.
9. Id. § 5300.
10. Id. §§ 5301-03.
11. Id. § 5302.
12. Id. § 5300.
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dure, including appointed counsel and habeas corpus relief.' 3 The
grounds for recertification are that the patient threatened or attempted
to take his own life during the previous holding periods or was taken
into custody as a result of such a threat or attempt. 14
Third, LPS provides for the appointment of a conservator to care
for a patient who remains allegedly gravely disabled. 15 The conserva-
tor has the power to place the conservatee in a locked mental treatment
facility.' 6 A temporary conservator may be appointed to serve until
resolution of the petition requesting appointment.' 7
The proposed conservatee may seek statutory habeas corpus relief
during the temporary conservatorship period' and has the right to re-
quest a jury trial following the hearing on the petition for appointment
of the conservator." 9 Until recently the conservatorship trial was
treated as a "civil" proceeding: decisions could be made by a non-
unanimous verdict on a mere preponderance of the evidence. Recent
decisions, however, have recognized that the deprivation experienced
by a conservatee who is placed in a hospital or other institution is not
unlike the plight of a convicted prisoner and that the stigma attached
to a person found gravely disabled is not unlike the stigma attached
to a criminal conviction. Accordingly, it has been concluded that the
criminal standards of proof of grave disability beyond a reasonable
doubt and jury unanimity are required in conservatorship trials.2" If
13. Id. §§ 5262-63 (West 1972 & Supp. 1977).
14. Id. § 5260.
15. Id. § 5350 (West Supp. 1977). Conservatorships can also be established
under the Probate Code. Section 1751 allows the establishment of a probate conserva-
torship if the proposed conservatee is unable "to provide for . . . personal needs for
physical health, food, clothing or shelter ....... CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp.
1977). LPS, on the other hand, authorizes only for a person who is "gravely disabled as
a result of mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism," and defines "gravely
disabled" as inability "to provide for . . . basic personal needs for food, clothing, or
shelter." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5350, 5008(h)(1) (West Supp. 1977)
(emphasis added). The important distinction between the two standards is that conserv-
atorships under LPS can only be authorized where the disability is the result of mental
disorder or alcoholism whereas probate conservatorships can be established regardless of
the cause of the inability to provide. Accordingly, only LPS provides for placement of
the conservatee in a psychiatric facility. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358 (West 1972
& Supp. 1977).
16. Id. § 5358 (West Supp. 1977).
17. Id. § 5352.1.
18. Id. § 5353.
19. Id. § 5350. If the proposed conservatee, prior to the conservatorship hearing,
demands a court or jury trial, he automatically waives the hearing. Id.
20. Conservatorship of Johnson, 135 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1977) (proof beyond a
reasonable doubt required); Conservatorship of Turner, 136 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1977) (proof
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a conservator is appointed, the conservatee may request a rehearing at
any time, but not in excess of once every six months. 2' The conserva-
torship automatically terminates at the end of one year, although the
conservator may petition annually for reappointment. 2
This framework has ameliorated a number of the abuses which
prompted reform of the civil commitment process. 23 The act has pro-
vided, with the notable exception of the seventy-two hour holding
period, counsel for the involuntarily confined and multiple opportuni-
ties for review of the basis for detention. The act has also made the
treatment facility staff more responsive to the patient's discharge de-
mands. Because the patient can elect to bring the staff into court,
where they probably do not wish to spend their time, the patient and
his attorney have both negotiating leverage and the attention of the psy-
chiatrist. Additionally, LPS provisions for periodic review minimize
the possibility that patients become lost or forgotten within the mental
health system. Periodic inquiry into the patient's condition keeps alive
the prospect of alternatives to involuntary hospitalization.
Unfortunately, some protective features of the act have been by-
passed as the flow of commitment cases takes the path of least legal
resistance. Although the framers of the act carefully crafted proce-
beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity required); Conservatorship of Thorn, L.
A. 30751 (4 Civ. 14737) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required); Conservatorship
of Atkinson, L.A. 30753 (4 Civ. 14989) (proof beyond reasonable doubt and jury una-
nimity required); Conservatorship of Roulet, 134 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1976) (proof beyond
a reasonable doubt required, jury unanimity issue raised but not passed upon). Petitions
for hearing before the California Supreme Court have been filed and granted in lohnson,
Thorn, Atkinson, and Roulet thereby vacating the lower appellate opinions. A petition
for rehearing has been granted in Turner and thus that opinion has also been vacated.
21. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5364 (West 1972).
22. Id. § 5361.
23. For a thorough study of pre-LPS commitment practices, see CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL
COMMITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA (1966) [hereinafter cited as DILEMMA]. The report
surveyed more than 300 hospitals caring for the mentally ill, and developed data on 83%
of all hospitalized psychiatric patients in California. Another study pointed out that
"[slerious inadequacies were discovered in the commitment process . . . . Often the
patient was brought in in a manner similar to the apprehension of a criminal. While in
the observation ward, the patient lost many of his civil rights, and there was little
emphasis on treatment during this period. The Department of Mental Hygiene found
that detention orders were routinely filed for all mental illness petitions in many
counties ....
. T.. [ ihe [Assembly] Subcommittee's central proposals were the elimination of
the commitment court, and the absolute termination of indefinite periods of involuntary
placement." ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL
HEALTH LAW (1969-1971) 13-14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ENKI].
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dural requirements for extending hospitalization of the suicidal or im-
minently dangerous patient, these requirements presently can be de-
feated by seeking conservatorship under the vague "gravely disabled"
standard. The overbreadth of this standard has swallowed up the pur-
posefully explicit provisions governing confinement of the allegedly
dangerous or suicidal.
Other provisions, while operating much as envisioned by the legis-
lature, have also proven inadequate. For example, once the seventy-
two hour detention is over, LPS provides for appointment of counsel
if the patient requests release.24 With the inevitable delays of the ap-
pointment process this provision has left most patients without legal
counsel during the first five or six days of involuntary confinement, a
deprivation that is unnecessary and unwise. In addition, although the
act makes provision for a rehearing following establishment of conser-
vatorship,2" the section has not served to prevent the unnecessary insti-
tutionalization of conservatees. Unfortunately, the act places the
burden of initiating this judicial review upon the often institutionalized
conservatee. As we shall explain, this unrealistically delegates the re-
sponsibility of terminating unwarranted confinement upon a patient
who may not be in a position to take such action. In our view, the
state should properly assume this obligation by mandating that ex-
tended hospitalization pursuant to a conservator's authority be subject
to a judicial ruling which limits the duration of commitment. Renewed
legislative or judicial attention to these areas, examined in greater de-
tail later, would bring the goals of the act closer to realization.
26
The Seventy-Two Hour Hold
As stated before, LPS does not require judicial supervision or
approval before a patient can be detained involuntarily at a psychiatric
facility. The act authorizes peace officers, members of a designated
evaluation facility, or other professional persons designated by the
county to take a person into custody upon probable cause 27 of danger
24. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5275-76 (West 1972).
25. Id. § 5364.
26. The announced legislative intent of LPS includes the following goals: "(a)
To end the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of mentally disordered
persons. . . . (d) To safeguard individual rights through judicial review ...... CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5001 (West 1972).
27. When passed in 1967, LPS required only "reasonable cause" for detention.
1967 Cal. Stats., ch. 1667, § 36, at 4074. This provision was amended to the present
"probable cause" requirement in 1971. 1971 Cal. Stats., ch. 1593, § 368, at 3337.
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to self or others, or grave disability due to mental disorder.28  This cus-
tody for evaluation and treatment extends for seventy-two hours, ex-
cluding weekends and holidays, without statutory provision for judicial
review. 29
The act is the product of legislative compromise over conflicting
therapeutic and libertarian concerns.30 The absence of review at the
first stage of commitment was a response to the contention of treatment
professionals that cumbersome judicial interference at the outset of
treatment would impede patient response to therapy."'
Whether or not this assertion of therapeutic impairment is sound,
it does not speak directly to the issue of whether a patient should have an
immediate right to consult with an attorney at the first stage of com-
mitment. Presently, most involuntary patients do not see an attorney
until as long as five or six days after admission.32 In our view, a num-
ber of reasons militate in favor of an immediate right to counsel at this
earliest phase of detention. First, the attorney can occupy an advisory
role, apprising the involuntary patient of his current legal status and
responding to questions concerning the nature and likelihood of further
detention. As one commentator has noted, "The consequences of
the seventy-two hour evaluation period are too critical for an individual
28. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1977). LPS also provides a
procedure whereby private parties can obtain court ordered evaluation of persons alleged
to be mentally disordered or impaired by chronic alcoholism or drug abuse. Id. §§ 5200-
30 (West 1972 & Supp. 1977). In brief, this procedure contemplates that a private party
will make allegations in a petition to a county officer designated to receive such
petitions. The county officer will conduct a screening of the suspected person to see if
he will submit to voluntary treatment. If such person refuses and if the county officer
has probable cause to believe the person is, as a result of mental disorder, chronic
alcoholism, or drug abuse, a danger to others, or to himself, or is gravely disabled, the
county officer can file a petition with the superior court. The court may issue an order
and may compel the suspected person, if still unwilling to cooperate, to undergo
evaluation according to the procedures of the seventy-two hour hold.
29. Id. § 5151 (West 1972).
30. For discussions of the legislative history of the LPS Act, see ENKI, supra note
23, at 8-18; E. BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN PoLrIcs; REPEALING THE MENTAL
COMMITMENT LAws IN CALIFORNIA (1972).
31. See ENKI, supra note 23, at 15.
32. As noted above, practically all involuntary patients who are represented by
counsel in Santa Clara County are represented by the public defender. See note 3 supra.
The Welfare and Institutions Code provides for notice to the public defender only at
certification, which occurs at the end of the seventy-two hour detention, if furthef
detention is sought. Since the seventy-two hour detention period excludes holidays and
weekends, and since weekends often intrude into the period, there is often no notice to
appointed counsel until four or five days after detention has begun. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5253 (West 1972).
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of questionable mental capacity to face without the aid of counsel.""
Not only does attorney involvement at this juncture provide informa-
tion from one familiar with LPS, but the attorney-client privilege
affords an opportunity for meaningful dialogue. The patient may
inquire freely about the law's application to his particular circum-
stances without fear that the questions asked or the information im-
parted will be used against him to justify further confinement.
In addition, involuntary detainees are often estranged from family
and friends-the attorney may well be their only contact with the world
outside the institution. The advisory function can serve as a significant
therapeutic tool, reassuring anxious patients that they have not been
abandoned behind locked doors. The knowledge that significant legal
protections attach if confinement is extended often allays concern and
promotes acceptance of treatment.14
It may also be tactically crucial for the attorney to be involved with
his client at the outset of confinement. Should a protracted commit-
ment ultimately result in judicial review, the patient's chances of pre-
vailing at a hearing can depend upon the attorney's awareness of the -
circumstances precipitating admission. First, and most obvious, it may
be that the doctor's conclusions concerning the patient's condition are
grounded upon erroneous or misleading information. Psychiatrists
themselves have shown that patient evaluations can be subject to
serious errors of judgment and that errors in labeling persons as men-
tally ill can be self-perpetuating.3" Even if the initial diagnosis appears
correct, counsel should nonetheless be fully cognizant of any improve-
ment in his client's condition or behavior after admission. Judges may
tend to presume the existence of some basis for confinement;36 it may
33. Comment, Compulsory Counsel for California's New Mental Health Law, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 851, 867 (1970). See also Note, The New York Mental Health
Information Service: A New Approach to Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 67
COLuM. L. REV. 672 (1967).
34. See Morris, The Confusion of the Confinement Syndrome, An Analysis of the
Confinement of Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correc-
tion of the State of New York, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 651, 688 (1968).
35. See Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379
(1973). Dr. Rosenhan, along with others, anonymously submitted himself to a period of
detention in a mental facility. In describing the experience he noted that "[o]nce a
person is designated abnormal, all of his other behaviors and characteristics are colored
by that label. Indeed, that label is so powerful that many of the psuedopatients' normal
behaviors [are] overlooked entirely or profoundly misinterpreted." Id. at 386-87.
36. One study found that under the pre-LPS standards "the medical examinations
and recommendations to the court. . . tend to presume mental illness, be performed in a
perfunctory manner, and are based on vague criteria." DILEMMA, supra note 23, at
177.
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therefore be fruitful for the patient's attorney to dwell on the disparity be-
tween the behavior which prompted the admitting diagnosis and the
client's recent, and presumably improved, behavior. While the staff
notes available in the client's medical chart offer some assistance in this
regard, they reflect the observations of persons who don't enjoy the
advocate's perspective.
Furthermore, there are concrete and pragmatic advocacy steps
which can be taken in the patient's behalf short of formal judicial re-
view. The attorney can communicate and arbitrate on behalf of the
involuntary patient. His advocacy skills, status, relative mobility, and
presumptive sanity all put him in a better position to do so than his
client.17
The final reason to require the appointment of counsel during the
seventy-two hour hold is to protect against the improper transfer of a
patient from the county in which he was originally detained to treatment
facilities in another county.38  Swift transfer of the patient may well
separate the patient from family or friends who could aid him in his
attempts to be released. Intercounty transfer during the seventy-two
hour hold can be blocked under the act only if the staff of the institution
in the detaining county is informed in writing of the patient's desire for
future judicial review.39 Thus, in the absence of counsel to protect the
patient's right to block immediate transfer, a patient can be moved
hundreds of miles to other treatment facilities, making attempts at gain-
ing release significantly more difficult and possibly removing the patient
from his only allies during his crisis.
37. An example from the authors' experience in Santa Clara County is illustrative.
A thirty-year-old patient stopped the public defender in the detaining facility and
requested assistance. He had been placed on a seventy-two hour hold which alleged that
he was a danger to others and gravely disabled. The patient was employed, and the
psychiatric staff had indicated their reluctance to discharge him before they were
convinced his condition was stable enough to foreclose the prospect of jeopardizing his
position once released. The Director of Inpatient Services was contacted by the public
defender who pointed out that speculation concerning the patient's capacity to cope with
work pressures would soon be moot, for one more day of absence would insure dismissal.
In this instance, the principal problem involved cutting through layers of staff to one
empowered to render an immediate discharge. The patient was discharged. Clearly,
intervention at a later stage would have come too late to save the man's job, and the
patient's unemployment would have served as a further factor to justify the allegation of
grave disability.
38. The code allows patients to be transferred "from the county providing evalua-
tion services to a different county for intensive treatment . . . ." CAL. WELF. &
INSt. CODE § 5276 (West 1972).
39. Id.
1415July 1977]
The importance of the seventy-two hour detention period cannot
be overstated. During this period, the foundational facts necessary to
justify further confinement can be obtained from the often disoriented
and uncounseled patient. Often, an isolated patient will have no visi-
tors during this period, so that observations are made only by treatment
personnel, whose training and assumptions may cause them to over-
look information favorable to the patient. The provision for imme-
diate counsel would act as a check on this tendency and would give
the patient contact with someone not a part of the treatment establish-
ment. It would also give the patient someone to voice his concerns
and requests and would express the concern of the community not just
for treatment, but also for protection of patients' rights and individual
liberty.
Fourteenth Day Certification: The Right to
Habeas Corpus
Following expiration of the seventy-two hour hold, continued
detention and treatment requires certification of the patient for a period
of intensive treatment not to exceed fourteen days.4" The basis of this
fourteen day certification is a staff determination that the individual,
as a result of mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism, is
a danger to others, a danger to himself, or is gravely disabled. In addi-
tion, LPS requires that the person has been advised of but has not ac-
cepted voluntary treatment and that the facility providing intensive
treatment is equipped and staffed to provide such treatment. 1 Notice
of the fourteen day certification must be filed with the superior court
and copies of the certification sent to the patient, his attorney, the dis-
trict attorney, and the public defender, if the relevant county has
created a public defenders office.42
The individual who delivers the notice of certification to the
patient is required by the act to inform him of his right to habeas cor-
pus, to explain the term, and to inform him of his right to counsel, in-
cluding the right to appointed counsel. 43  The patient may immediately
make his request for judicial review to the informing party or to any
member of the treatment staff at any time during the fourteen day
40. Id. § 5250.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 5253 (West Supp. 1977). See note 32 supra.
43. Id. § 5252 (West 1972). LPS provides that the patient must reimburse the
public defender if he is able. Id. § 5276.
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period.44  The requested hearing must be held within two judicial
days of the filing of the patient's petition and the court must release
the petitioner if any of the conditions for certification are found not to
exist. 45
In our experience, habeas hearings tend to focus on the broad
"gravely disabled" standard as opposed to the more specific alternatives
of danger to self or others. The patient-petitioner may enlist the aid
of neighbors and friends who are either in a position to controvert the
alleged facts upon which the doctors base their diagnosis or who will
commit themselves to providing sufficient support and guidance to pre-
vent a recurrence of the situation which precipitated commitment.
However, community assistance of this sort is frequently unavailable,
and the petitioner generally must rely upon his demeanor to persuade
the court that the alleged mental disorder, if it exists, does not render
him dangerous or incapable of providing for his basic personal needs.
This may prove extremely difficult, for the doctor may seek to intro-
duce everything unfavorable he has ever heard about the petitioner.
While such testimony would seem to constitute blatant hearsay, it is ad-
mitted not for the truth of the matter stated but as the basis for the
doctor's opinion that grounds for certification exist.4 6
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the habeas corpus provisions in
reducing the potential for inappropriate commitment is not entirely de-
pendent upon the integrity of the review itself. For example, any con-
tested habeas hearing necessarily involves the commitment of at least
one staff member's time, an extremely limited resource. Accordingly,
the filing of the petition for habeas corpus often triggers an informal
but no less significant review by the attending staff. Counsel must be
active in promoting such prehearing screening, for many inappropriate
detentions are terminated by the holding facility prior to formal judicial
intervention.
Counsel's role at the habeas corpus stage, of course, involves much
more than out-of-court negotiation for release of a patient. In Santa
44. Id. § 5275. Such a request by a patient must be transmitted to the superior
court without delay. Failure to notify the court of a patient's request for a writ of
habeas corpus is a misdemeanor. Id.
45. Id. § 5276. The various procedures described above were declared constitu-
tional in Thorn v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970).
46. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 1972). However, vigorous
resistance to the admission of such testimony in a trial by jury should have considerably
more success. Even if deemed relevant, such evidence is manifestly .prejudicial and only
minimally probative. Counsel might stress additionally that the purpose of annual
review is frustrated when the proposed conservatee can be condemned by his past acts.
July 1977]
Clara County, for instance, the public defender personally advises every
certified individual of his rights and remedies. In a county with a large
number of certifications, the public defender must make frequent,
often daily visits to the detaining facilities. Such contact with treatment
facilities alerts the attorney to hospital conditions which prompt ac-
tions or statements by clients which otherwise appear inexplicable or
indicative of the patient's abnormality. 7
Indeed, the public defender's activities within evaluation and
detention facilities can and should go beyond those of a legal advocate
to reflect the responsibilities of an informal patient's ombudsman as
well. Obviously, a staff member prepared to listen and respond to
patient complaints can serve to ameliorate much dissatisfaction with the
involuntary hospitalization. Unfortunately, hospital officials attempting
to serve in this capacity may be inextricably cast in the role of the pa-
tient's adversary or may lack the requisite independence to act on the
patient's requests. Thus, there may be compelling reasons for a patient
to express dissatisfaction to an independent party rather than a staff
member. First, the patient will want to appear as cooperative as
possible to the treatment personnel with the power to recommend re-
lease. Moreover, if the complaint focuses on a treating psychiatrist, it
would be purposeless to address it to the lower echelon personnel.
Similarly, the lower level staff members with whom the patient has
greatest contact may not be eager to act upon complaints which chal-
lenge longstanding hospital policy. Finally, sheer work pressure can
prevent staff members from dealing adequately with patient grievances.
These considerations lend strong support to the concept of a
formally appointed independent patient's ombudsman. However, in
the absence of such an official, the public defender should assist in pre-
venting irritations from festering to the point at which treatment is
subverted.
Frequent visitation to the evaluation facility by the public defender
will also benefit those patients who do not initially oppose involuntary
47. In a Santa Clara County case known to one of the authors, a patient's medical
chart reported that she spent all day in bed, an observation that seemed to support the
allegation that she was gravely disabled. The patient, however, was provided with a
small living area, with space for only a bed and one hardbacked chair. Although there
was a communal space for all patients, that area was extremely smoky and noisy. The
patient enjoyed reading and required some quiet spot where she could do so. That
limited her to her room and her bed was more comfortable than the single chair.
Counsel's awareness of these facts, gained through visitation and observation, enabled
him to respond to the contention, made at the habeas hearing, that the patient's behavior
indicated that she was so "withdrawn" as to be gravely disabled.
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hospitalization but who soon chafe under the restrictions and desire re-
lease. The physicial presence of an attorney consulting with fellow pa-
tients is a powerful reminder to a certified patient that legal means for
release are available. Because of the problems of disorientation and
institutionally induced apathy among patients, 48 such reminders serve
to make the patient's right to habeas corpus a real as well as a formal
right.
Finally, the California Supreme Court's decision in Thorn v.
Superior Court49 should be noted. In Thorn, the superior court in San
Diego County, soon after LPS was enacted, appointed a public interest
law firm as attorneys for all patients certified in San Diego health care
facilities. The superior court reasoned that since a patient cannot be
certified unless he refuses voluntary treatment, each patient who is in
fact certified is being treated against his will and would prefer to be
released. 50 Thus, certification was equated with a request for a habeas
corpus hearing under LPS, logically precluding the possibility that any
patient in San Diego could be certified without impliedly requesting a
habeas corpus hearing.
The supreme court refused to issue a writ of prohibition against
the superior court, commenting that the superior court's approach "is
sound and should be sustained at this stage of. . .experimental legis-
lation in the field of the care and treatment of the mentally ill."'" The
supreme court observed that the superior court's action was consistent
with the general legislative policy in LPS favoring due process for incar-
cerated mental patients. Also, the supreme court argued that certified
patients might not be able to understand the right of habeas corpus or
might be unable to request it. Finally, the court suggested that there
was a conflict of interest to the extent that the same hospital personnel
responsible for the patient's intensive care was also responsible for ex-
plaining to the patient his rights.5"
In so holding, the Thorn court resisted a mechanical application
of the act, focusing instead on the humanitarian goals which had in-
spired its passage. The court thus sanctioned an activist approach
to the pursuit of due process for the involuntarily committed. Similarly,
counsel for confined patients must take an active role within the institu-
48. For a discussion of the effects of involuntary hospitalization on mental
patients, see R. PRICE & B. DENNER, TAE MAKING OF A MENTAL PATIENT 278-79 (1973).
49. 1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970).
50. Id. at 672, 464 P.2d at 60, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 673, 464 P.2d at 62, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
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tion, seeking to ensure that patients are accorded the full benefit of
both the act's technical provisions and its underlying intent. The role
of unofficial ombudsman is only one example of the extra-judicial
efforts which patients' rights advocates must assume in furtherance of
LPS goals.
Imprecise and Inconsistent Certification Standards
Clearly, not all commitment cases can be resolved by the public
defender's threat of court proceedings or by reducing friction within the
detention facility. Where certification litigation is required, the certi-
fication standards themselves become important.53 Unfortunately, the
vagueness and imprecision of certain of the commitment standards has
impaired the efficacy and integrity of the certification hearing.
As stated before, LPS was the product of compromise. As part
of the compromise, the specificity of commitment standards tends to
be positively correlated to the length of confinement.54 With the ex-
ception of the "gravely disabled" standard, which applies to both certifi-
cation and conservatorship, the longer one remains confined, the more
narrow and precise the basis for detention becomes. For example, an
individual may be certified for a fourteen-day commitment because he
is allegedly "a danger to others."55 By contrast, extended "postcertifi-
cation" hospitalization of the same individual requires that he have
"threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm upon the person of
another"56 either before or after having been taken into custody. Simi-
larly, while fourteen-day certification of the allegedly suicidal patient
can be based on an undefined "danger to self," recertification requires
that during the previous holding period the patient must have "threat-
ened or attempted to take his own life or . . .was detained for evalua-
tion and treatment because he threatened or attempted to take his
own life . . . -17 By so narrowing and refining the standards,
the legislature seems to be saying that something less than attempted
or threatened suicide or attempted or threatened physical harm is
53. See text accompanying notes 9-17 supra.
54. "In designing the actual provisions of the Act, some obstacles were deliberately
created to discourage longer periods of -involuntary treatment. The involuntary system
established in LPS was viewed as a funnel with a relatively large and simple entrance
and increasingly narrow criteria and complex procedural requirements for every extended
period of involuntary treatment." ENKI, supra note 23, at 17.
55. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 1972).
56. Id. § 5300.
57. Id. § 5260.
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sufficient to justify detention for the initial fourteen days. The failure
to specify how much less is required has invited the speculation of
doctors and judges alike.5" Ironically the need for specific standards
was a major consideration during pre-LPS debate. 9
The third basis for confinement, the "gravely disabled" standard,
is perhaps the most vague. This standard is equally applicable to four-
teen-day certifications and to conservatorships. The Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code now defines "gravely disabled" as "[a] condition in which
a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his
basic personal needs for food, clothing or shelter . . . . 60 In first ar-
ticulating this standard, the Subcommittee on Mental Health Services
pointed to those "exceptional emergency cases where the person is so
disabled or so uncontrolled that he is incapable of participating in plan-
ning for his own needs."'" Examples cited by the subcommittee in-
cluded the young man who becomes uncommunicative, refuses to leave
his room or eat and begins to soil himself, and the young woman who
58. Two recent habeas corpus hearings in Santa Clara County illustrate the
uncertainty of present certification criteria. In the first case a petitioner was certified, in
part, as a danger to others. While the testifying psychiatrist could recall no occasion in
which the petitioner had assaulted or threatened to assault another person, he was aware
that the patient had verbally abused a member of his family. This, the doctor concluded,
rendered the petitioner a "psychological" danger to others. The judge apparently agreed
with the psychiatrist's interpretation of the "danger to others" standard and denied the
petition.
In the second case, an individual was certified as a danger to self after the seventy-
two hour hold and was removed from an unstructured ward to a locked, tightly
supervised floor. Although the patient had never attempted or even threatened to hurt
himself, his treating psychiatrist explained that he was so meddlesome and provocative
that it was feared other patients would assault and injure him. Apparently the doctor
was uninfluenced by the fact that the only patient who had been overtly hostile to this
person was in the facility because he was alleged to be a danger to others. Such
reasoning produced a unique inversion of the criminal justice system in which the victim
was locked up for the actions of the aggressor. This patient's petition for habeas corpus
was also denied.
59. Prior to the passage of LPS, commitment could be recommended pursuant to
former Welfare and Institutions Code section 5550 if the person's mental state rendered
him "(A) . . . in need of supervision, treatment, care or restraint. (B). . . dangerous
to themselves or to the person and property of others. . . ." 1965 Cal. Stats., ch. 391, §
5550, at 1654 (repealed 1969). One superior court judge commented on the effect of
the vague pre-LPS commitment standards: "Section A is so vague that one does not
actually know what it means . . . . And I'm frank to say that the result of the
vagueness of 'A' [was] that as a judge for many, many months, I went along with the
system just because commitment was recommended and without asking any questions, I
committed. In other words, I was proceeding on the theory [that since] they were there,
they were presumed to be mentally ill." DILEMMA, supra note 23, at 40.
60. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h) (West Supp. 1977).
61. DILEMMA, supra note 23, at 137.
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faints and thereafter acts as if unconscious.' 2 The definition finally
adopted by the legislature has proven susceptible of a wide range of
interpretations.63
As noted, the current imprecision of the gravely disabled standard
is somewhat ironic, since the vagueness of the pre-LPS standards and
the resulting evils of overcommitment and inconsistent application were
major criticisms in the legislative study that led to LPS.64 As that study
noted, there appears to be "a tendency at the hearings to recommend
commitment."65 It is only human for the examiner to fear that the peti-
tioner may create or be the victim of some misfortune and to conclude
that the potential for disaster is foreclosed when release is denied.
When standards are vague and indefinite, this tendency toward commit-
ment of patients is encouraged.
A second evil of imprecise commitment standards is that they pro-
mote certification based upon the subjective moral and social standards
of the fact finder. In the context of will contests and contract invalida-
tion, Professor Milton Green has discussed the effect of mental incom-
petence standards which were vague and imprecise. 66 Professor Green
notes that in obvious cases, these vague standards proved adequate."7
Green points out, however, that most cases are not obvious. In these
cases, he states, courts fall back on an inarticulate standard, 8 the
essence of which is the abnormality of the transaction in question. In
such a hearing, the result is governed more by the fact finder's moral
judgment of the individual's actions than on evidence bearing on the
express standard. 69 In civil commitment hearings, no less than in will
contests, the substitution of fact finder's mores for the three expressed
62. Id.
63. Stephen Donoviel, program director of acute psychology at Napa State Hospi-
tal in Northern California has said, "There is a great deal of variance on how counties
interpret the meaning of grave disability (unable to provide for food, clothing, and
shelter). To provide for food, clothing, and housing in some counties is taken extremely
literally, to the point of saying, can he put the spoon to his mouth, while other counties
have a much broader definition it seems." Ellanson, supra note 3. at 65. As program
director at Napa State Hospital, Dr. Donoviel comes into contact with mental patients
from many Northern California counties and thus is in a unique position to assess
county-to-county variation in interpreting the gravely disabled standard.
64. See note 59 supra.
65. DILEMMA, supra note 23, at 41.
66. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53
YALE L.J. 271 (1944).
67. Id. at 274, 310-11.
68. Id. at 310.
69. Id.
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standards is greatly facilitated by their indefinite criteria. While such
a procedure may arguably be suitable for determinations of who gets
what in property disposition, such standards are inappropriate in the
civil commitment process where fundamental personal liberties hang in
the balance.
In addition, the gravely disabled standard can operate in a boot-
strapping fashion to justify commitment for supervision, treatment or
care. Hospitalization which results in the loss of a patient's job or
apartment may make him temporarily unable to provide food or shelter
which renders him gravely disabled under some interpretations of
the present test.70  The contention that the hospitalization is respon-
sible for any inability to provide meets with the circular retort that men-
tal illness is responsible for the hospitalization and is therefore the true
source of the incapacity.
Finally, the question of what constitutes basic personal needs is
largely dependent upon the fact finder's idiosyncratic view of appropri-
ate lifestyles. Here, too, the inarticulate standard of normality will
largely dictate the resolution of the issue. Thus, the real danger pre-
sented by the "gravely disabled" standard is that it allows the commit-
ment procedure to operate on the basis of subjective rather than objec-
tive considerations.
One possible way to insure that the "gravely disabled" standard
will be applied objectively rather than subjectively would be to amend
the statute to utilize the test suggested by the earlier legislature study:
whether the individual is "incapable of carrying on transactions neces-
sary to survival . ". .., This test avoids inquiry into the manner in
which the patient acquires his necessities and avoids any inference by
courts, juries or doctors that the patient is gravely disabled if he is
not actively engaged in the process of procuring food, clothing, and
shelter by his own efforts. 2
70. See CAL. WELE. & INST. CoDE § 5008 (West Supp. 1977). The serious
impact of hospitalization on the patient has long been noted. "Ex-patients often found
their former way of life shattered beyond repair with each release . . . . They
underwent a constant drainage and depletion of their social resources with each hospital
stay." D. MILLER & W. DAwsoN, WoRLDs THAT FAIL, PART II: DISBANDED
WoRLDs: A STUDY OF RETURNS TO THE MENTAL HosPiTAL 45 (California Department
of Mental Hygiene, California Mental Health Research Monograph No. 7, 1965).
71. DILEMMA, supra note 23, at 133 (emphasis omitted).
72. That inference has been recently found to be an unconstitutional basis for
confinement. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Court in O'Connor
held that "a state cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individu-
al who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing
and responsible family members or friends." Id. at 576.
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In the case of Conservatorship of Turner,73 a California court of
appeal appeared to suggest another test. The court in Turner ex-
amined the contention that the term "gravely disabled" is unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad. In an opinion that has been recently
vacated for a rehearing the court found that the term was sufficiently
precise to withstand a constitutional attack. The court noted that grave
disability required more than adherence to a "nonconformist" lifestyle
and stated that the term "connote[d] an inability on the part of the
proposed conservatee to care for his own basic personal needs. ' 74 The
court went on to point out that "[a] jury can made a determination,
based on common experience, that a proposed conservatee is mal-
nourished, inadequately clothed, or suffering from exposure. ' 75
If the Turner court was suggesting that exposure or malnourish-
ment are examples of grounds that a jury can use in reaching a finding
of grave disability, then the court did not answer the claim that the
standard is susceptible of too many interpretations. If, on the other
hand, the court was declaring that "gravely disabled" refers to a condi-
tion in which the individual, by reason of mental disorder, is "mal-
nourished, inadequately clothed, or suffering from exposure," then the
court was essentially providing a new working definition. It may well
be that the court was exercising its general power to construe statutes
in such a way as to avoid constitutional defects.7" If so, the construc-
tion offered by the court answers many of the objections previously
made concerning the "gravely disabled" language. It remains to be
seen, however, what the Turner court will do after rehearing, and
whether the courts will accept the Turner language as the working defi-
nition for grave disability.
As indicated earlier,77 the "gravely disabled" standard is the only
one of the three bases for confinement which does not become more
narrowly defined as fourteen-day certification ripens into more lengthy
confinement. As a result, it has become a broad catch-all to ensure
continuing detention for treatment of the dangerous patient as well as
the gravely disabled.78 While it is true that some of the patients initial-
ly certified as dangerous are transferred to a state facility in another
73. 66 Cal. App. 3d 391, 136 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1977).
74. Id. at 397, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 56,
550 P.2d 600, 608, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 336 (1976).
77. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
78. Not one postcertification petition for a dangerous person, for example, was
filed in Santa Clara County between October 1975 and October 1976.
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county or channeled into the criminal justice system, 79 the postcertifica-
tion petition is shunned principally because "it is a very formidable pro-
cedure .... ,,80 The procedure requires not only a jury trial but also
a unanimous verdict on the question whether the patient "presents an
imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others."'" Further-
more, the trial must be held within ten judicial days of the filing of
the petition.8 2 Rather than confronting these stringent requirements,
psychiatrists turn to the concededly "inappropriate method of applying
for conservatorship, which is done in many cases."8' 3 Hence, not only
is the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict bypassed, 84 but the jury
trial itself may be postponed for up to forty days from the filing of the
petition."' Thus the statutory protections for the allegedly dangerous
79. Under the act, a criminal defendant who appears imminently dangerous or
gravely disabled due to chronic alcoholism or the use of narcotics or other restricted
drugs can be ordered by a judge to a facility for evaluation. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5225 (West 1972). Upon evaluation such a patient can be put on seventy-two
hour hold, certified for intensive treatment, or recommended for conservatorship and
thus removed from the criminal justice system. Id. § 5230. During the period of
evaluation and treatment criminal charges must be dismissed or suspended. Id. § 5226.1.
If at the conclusion of any evaluation and treatment charges remain, the defendant must
be returned to custody for disposition of those charges. Id.
Similarly, a criminal defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial under
Penal Code section 1370 may be placed under a conservatorship. When the conservator
certifies that the conservatee has recovered his mental competence, however, he must be
taken back into custody for disposition of the criminal charges. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5369 (West Supp. 1977).
80. Statement of Dr. Harold Wollack, M.D., Ph.D., Chief of Medical Staff,
Westwood Manor, Fremont, California, quoted in Ellanson, supra note 3, at 45.
81. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5303, 5304 (West 1972).
82. Id.
83. Statement of Dr. Barbara Arons, M.D., psychiatric medicine, quoted in Ellan-
son, supra note 3, at 44. See also Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in
California: 1969 Style, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 74, 81 (1969). The author of that
comment, a California psychiatrist studying law, stated that, as of 1969, conservatorships
for the allegedly gravely disabled were "being used to detain the person who is thought to
be 'potentially dangerous' but who has not actually threatened or performed an assaultive
act during the initial fourteen day certification period."
84. As indicated earlier, recent appellate decisions indicate that conservatorship
trials also require a unanimous verdict. Conservatorship of Atkinson, L.A. 30753 (4
Civ. 14989); Conservatorship of Turner, 136 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1977). The California
Supreme Court has granted petition for a hearing on the question thus vacating Atkinson
and the court of appeal has granted a rehearing in Turner thereby vacating that decision
as well.
85. LPS gives a patient who is named in a petition as imminently dangerous the
right to a jury trial within ten judicial days of the filing of the petition. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5303 (West 1972). If a conservatorship on account of grave disability
is sought, however, a thirty day temporary conservatorship with no right to jury trial
may be established. Id. § 5352.1 (West Supp. 1977).
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patient are circumvented by reclassifying those patients as gravely
disabled.
In summary, because the legislature ten years ago recognized the
invitation to abuse presented by vague commitment standards, it nar-
rowed the bases for detention under the "danger to self" and "danger
to others" standards. The gravely disabled standard, however, still
lacks necessary specificity. The narrowed construction of the standard
presented by the vacated opinion of the court in Conservatorship of
Turner8 offers a definition which can minimize uncertainty, subjectiv-
ity, and inconsistency when the question of grave disability is passed
upon. Further legislative or judicial attention is necessary to make
"gravely disabled" a standard which can be understood and applied.
Conservatorship
LPS vests extensive powers in the conservator of one found
gravely disabled at a conservatorship hearing or trial. In addition to
the powers granted a conservator over the conservatee's person and
property pursuant to the California Probate Code,87 the LPS conserva-
tor has the power to place the conservatee in a private psychiatric insti-
tution, state hospital, sanitorium, or nursing facility.88
The establishment of a conservatorship is triggered by the recom-
mendation of the director of an evaluation and treatment center that
conservatorship is necessary.89 This recommendation is made to a
86. 136 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1977).
87. Welfare and Institutions Code section 5357 provides that all LPS conservators
"shall have the general powers specified in Section 1852 of the Probate Code and such
additional powers specified in Section 1853 of the Probate Code as the court may
designate." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357 (West Supp. 1977). Under the Probate
Code the conservator has care, custody, and control of the conservatee and may fix the
conservatee's residence at any place within the state. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1851 (West
Supp. 1977). That section also states that, as of July 1, 1977, the probate conservator
does not have the power to place the conservatee in a mental health facility. Id. The
conservator may also petition the court for power to take complete control of the
conservatee's assets, to operate the conservatee's "business, farm, or enterprise," to enter
into and to perform contracts for the conservatee, and to do virtually anything with the
conservatee's property or business necessary to protect the conservatee's estate. CAL.
PROB. CODE § 1853 (West Supp. 1977).
88. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358 (West Supp. 1977).
89. See id. § 5352. Under this section, only the director can make this recommen-
dation. This does not necessarily mean that the proposed conservatee must have been
evaluated or treated in the facility under section 5150 or under court order. See id. §§
5200-13 (West 1972 & Supp. 1977). A 1972 amendment allows the director of an
evaluation and treatment facility to make such a recommendation if he or a designee has
examined the propsed conservatee and has determined that the proposed conservatee is so
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county agency charged with conservatorship investigations. ° If an offi-
cer of such an agency concurs with the recommendation, he petitions
the superior court to establish a conservatorship." If he pleads for a
temporary conservatorship, as, in our experience, is very frequently the
case, the director of the patient's treatment facility can keep the patient
for three days past the fourteen-day certification period if the additional
time is necessary for the establishment of a temporary conservator-
ship. 2 The act thus encourages doctors who wish to perpetuate invol-
untary therapy to begin conservatorship proceedings when the need for
conservatorship and its profound consequences are not the real basis
for the proceedings. One public guardian officer working for Santa
Clara County has complained that just such a practice has been used
to extend treatment time.9
3
Upon petition of the county officer in charge of conservatorship
investigations, the superior court typically establishes a temporary con-
servatorship.94 LPS provides that the petitioning county officer or
other officer designated by the county is to be the temporary con-
servator. The temporary conservatorship extends for a period not to
exceed thirty days, although it may be extended if the proposed con-
servatee requests a trial on the proposed conservatorship.9 5 During the
thirty day tenure of the temporary conservatorship, the proposed con-
servatee has the same statutory right to habeas corpus review accorded
to him during the fourteen-day certification period.96 While such a
hearing is subject to the same infirmities discussed earlier,97 it may
assume a new importance when used during the temporary conservator-
ship. Even if the writ application is denied, the hearing can be used
obviously gravely disabled that examination on an inpatient basis is unnecessary. Id. §
5352 (West Supp. 1977).
In contrast, a probate conservatorship may be sought by "[any person or any
relative or friend of any person, other than a creditor of the proposed conservatee . .. ."
CAL. PROB. CODE § 1754 (West Supp. 1977). Under that section the proposed
conservatee has the right to a hearing or jury trial to oppose the petition for a
conservatorship and the right to counsel, including the right to appointed counsel if he
cannot retain one himself.
90. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5351 (West 1972).
91. See id. § 5352 (West Supp. 1977).
92. Id. § 5352.3 (West 1972).
93. Ellanson, supra note 3, at 51.
94. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352.1 (West Supp. 1977). Under this section,
the court can base its decision on either investigation of the county officer or the affi-
davit of the professional person who originally recommended conservatorship to the
county officer. See id. § 5352, 5354.
95. Id. § 5352.1.
96. Id. § 5353.
97. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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as a valuable pretrial discovery tool. The attorney can elicit informa-
tion of strategic significance and can familiarize himself with the court-
room comportment of both the doctor and the proposed conservatee.
Also at this time, informal avenues for terminating the conservatorship
proceedings may be explored.
LPS calls for an independent investigation to be conducted during
this period. The investigating officer is required to explore all alterna-
tives to conservatorship and can recommend conservatorship only if no
suitable alternatives are available. 98  The ultimate recommendation
must be made in light of all relevant aspects of the proposed conserva-
tee's medical, psychological, financial, family, vocational, and social
condition. 9 One can reasonably expect the investigator to be conver-
sant with the circumstances supporting the recomendation of the doc-
tor or other professional. Counsel for the patient can aid the investiga-
tion, both by channeling favorable information about the client to the
investigator and by suggesting and promoting alternatives to conserva-
torship.
Within thirty days of the filing of the petition, there must be a
conservatorship hearing in superior court.100 Such a hearing may seem
unnecessary in light of the two habeas corpus hearings previously avail-
able. However, this is the first and only point in the conservatorship
proceedings scheme at which review is mandatory. Because judicial
review at this point is not dependent on the initiative of the patient or
his counsel, it assures that those patients who have been overlooked
at earlier stages are not again ignored. Moreover, the hearing on the
petition for appointment of a conservator embraces issues not raised
earlier. The focus may shift from the condition of the proposed conser-
vatee to the qualifications of the proposed conservator. Welfare and
Institutions Code section 5355 provides, in part, that "no person, cor-
poration, or agency shall be designated as conservator whose interests,
activities, obligations or responsibilities are such as to compromise his
or their ability to represent and safeguard the interests of the conserva-
tee."' 0 '
Thus, the proposed appointment of a private party-for example,
a relative-may provoke inquiry into potential conflicts of interest.
While the appointment of a public agency is unlikely to produce a simi-
98. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5354 (West Supp. 1977).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 5365.
101. Id. § 5355.
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lar conflict, the agency's capacity to protect the conservatee's interests
can be measured by its past performance with respect to other conser-
vatees. A host of problems, ranging from understaffing to inflexible
policies, may undermine the public agency's ability to perform com-
petently within the meaning of section 5355.
It is interesting that the act specifically provides for waiver of the
hearing if the proposed conservatee demands a court or jury trial before
the date of hearing. 11 2  This provision impliedly recognizes that the
jury trial may represent the most potent weapon in the LPS attorney's
arsenal. First, there is a diffusion of responsibility inherent in a deter-
mination by twelve people, rather than by one person. This diffusion
tends to minimize paternalism. When the burden of all the remotely
possible adverse consequences of discharge does not rest on one indi-
vidual, the decision is more likely to reflect the state of the evidence
on the issue of grave disability, rather than a paternalistic concern for
the proposed conservatee's "best interest."
Extensive voir dire can also help assure that the decision is a
product of neither paternalism nor mere deference to presumed psy-
chiatric expertise. While the range of useful questions is extremely
broad, some specific inquiries which find their way into virtually every
conservatorship trial illustrate the utility of vigorous voir dire. For ex-
ample, the attorney should focus on the bifurcated "gravely disabled"
standard, educating the jury to demand that both the mental disorder
and the inability to provide are proven. Also, jurors should be sought
who are not reluctant to look beyond the opinion of the psychiatrist to
the facts upon which he bases his decision and to reject his opinion if
they consider it unreasonable. The attorney must be sensitive to the
presence of prospective jurors for whom the proposed conservatee's
need for treatment assumes fundamental importance. Active inquiry
into these and related areas can yield a finder of fact prepared to apply
the legal test for grave disability with great care.
Beyond the increased likelihood of an objective judgment, the
prospect of trial itself before twelve citizens has a significant impact on
the psychiatric community. As one Santa Clara county psychiatrist
stated, "no psychiatrist wants to . . . be cross-examined and accused
of lying before a jury."' 0  Moreover, the investment of time is likely
to be even more substantial for the doctor than it is at a habeas corpus
hearing.
102. Id. § 5350.
103. Ellanson, supra note 3, at 79.
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Accordingly, the scheduling of a jury trial creates pressure for
cooperation and compromise within the psychiatric community. Such
an attitude is useful not only in procuring the outright dismissal of a
conservatorship petition but also in promoting compliance with sound
principles of mental health law not yet accorded express statutory or
constitutional status in California. For example, many patients have no
objection to having their assets controlled by a conservator, but strongly
desire transfer from a locked facility to a board and care home. Those
patients who remain gravely disabled yet do not require confinement
seem to fall within the ambit of the humane and sensible "least restric-
tive alternative" rule articulated recently by a federal court in the Dis-
trict of Columbia in Dixon v. Weinberger.'
In Dixon, plaintiffs asked for a declaratory judgment that those
patients in a locked facility who did not require such confinement be
removed to nursing homes and halfway houses. The federal district
court agreed, grounding its decision on statutory law. The court further
ordered the District of Columbia and the federal government to
develop the unlocked facilities required. As yet, neither LPS itself nor
any California court has expressly held that a conservatee may not be
deprived of any more liberty than is absolutely necessary."'0  While it
104. 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975). The Dixon court also quoted from Lake v.
Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966): "[Dleprivations of liberty solely
because of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary
for their own protection." 405 F. Supp. at 977.
105. LPS contains some provisions which show a legislative intent that the conser-
vatee's freedom be restricted only if necessary. The act provides, for example, that
"[tihe officer providing conservatorship investigation shall investigate all available alter-
natives to conservatorship and shall recommend conservatorship to the court only if no
suitable alternatives are available. The officer shall render to the court a written re-
port of investigation prior to the [conservatorship] hearing. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5354 (West Supp. 1977). Once a conservator has been appointed, however, the act
directs only that if commitment or treatment is required, priority should be given to
a "suitable" facility as close as possible to the conservatee's home or the home of a
relative. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5354, 5358 (West Supp. 1977).
The temporary conservator is under a qualified duty to find least restrictive
placement for the conservatee through the requirement that he give preference to
"arrangements which allow the [conservatee] to return to his home, family or friends."
Id. § 5353. A full-fledged conservator, on the other hand, is only required to find
alternative placement for his conservatee "after he is notified by the person in charge of
the facility serving the conservatee that the conservatee no longer needs the care or
treatment offered by that facility ...... Id. § 5359 (West 1972). The conservator has
seven days after such notice to place the conservatee. Even the 7 day requirement is
diluted by the provision that if "unusual conditions or circumstances" are present, the
conservator has 30 days to find alternative placement, and, furthermore, that "if
alternative placement cannot be found at the end of the 30 day period the conservator
shall confer with the professional person in charge of the facility and they shall then
1430 [Vol. 28
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seems surprising that no appellate case has spoken to this issue, we
believe that the reexamination of alternatives by doctors which fre-
quently follows the setting of a postcertification or conservatorship trial
has operated to blunt this issue. In the face of a trial, members of the
psychiatric community have tended to recognize and comply with the
patient's desire to be transferred away from unnecessary confinement.
Significantly, the spirit of compromise is not unilateral. The pros-
pect of exposing oneself to the scrutiny and judgment of twelve stran-
gers is not an attractive one. Proposed conservatees, therefore, tend
to make a reflective decision, often considering or proposing modified
circumstances under which they would desire or accept conservatorship.
Such modifications include a change of facility, guaranteed discharge
date, financial adjustments, or outpatient status. Thus, the jury trial
has not only failed to overburden the judicial system, as some feared,
but has also facilitated therapeutic goals. There is widespread agree-
ment within the psychiatric community that voluntary rather than invol-
untary treatment of patients is far more efficacious. LPS has, in many
cases in our experience, transformed disgruntled, involuntary patients
into those who have decided for their own reasons to accept psychiatric
intrusion into their lives.
Conservatorship Rehearings
One of the most important reforms of LPS was the prohibition of
indefinite periods of confinement.'" 8 To that end, the act limited the
period of conservatorship to one year,1 7 provided for mandatory review
with the right to a jury trial as a condition for reappointment of a con-
servator, 08 and provided the conservatee the right to request a rehear-
ing during the course of conservatorship.'0 9
The section of LPS affording conservatees the right to rehearing
was, before its recent amendment, brief and ambiguous. It read in its
determine the earliest practicable date when such alternative placement may be ob-
tained." Id. Section 5359 is open to criticism. Placing reliance upon the treatment
facility to terminate unnecessary confinement is no more realistic than depending upon
the overburdened public conservator to do so.
Finally, the act lists various rights that conservatees must be provided. These rights
include the conservatee's right to his own clothing, visitors, storage space, telephone
access, and, most important of all, the right to refuse convulsive treatment and psy-
chosurgery. Id. § 5325 (West Supp. 1977). Not even the superior court can order a
conservatee to undergo such extraordinary treatment. See id. § 5326.6.
106. See note 26 supra.
107. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 5361 (West 1972).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 5364. Termination provisions for probate conservatorships are much
more liberal. The Probate Code provides that "[any conservator, the conservatee, or
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entirety: "At any time but not to exceed six months, the conservatee
may petition the superior court for a rehearing as to his status as a con-
servatee."" In Heinreid v. Superior Court,"' a California Court of
Appeal held that a conservatee was not entitled to a rehearing until
six months after the establishment of a conservatorship at the jury
trial.11 2 The Heinreid decision was quickly overruled by the legislature
with enactment of Assembly Bill 4131 on September 12, 1976.113 As-
sembly Bill 4131 amended section 5364 to read:
At any time, the conservatee may petition the superior court for
a rehearing as to his status as a conservatee. However, after the
filing of the first petition for rehearing pursuant to this section, no
further petition for rehearing shall be submitted for a period of six
months." 4
Remaining unanswered, however, is the question whether the
right to rehearing creates the right to another jury trial or merely the
right to a court hearing. Heinreid declared the right to a jury trial on
rehearing "uncertain" but noted that academic opinion supported such
a right." 5 Further support for a jury trial comes from Assembly Bill
4131. The bill amends section 5358.3 to create a new right to a hear-
ing for a conservatee to attempt to regain specific rights, such as the
power to enter into contracts, taken from him at the establishment of
the conservatorship." 6 In creating the new right, the legislature spe-
cifically provided that hearings "pursuant to this section shall not in-
clude trial by jury."' 7  This new section suggests that the legislature
did not intend to deny the right to a jury trial by its silence as to sec-
tion 5364 conservatorship rehearings.
Aside from matters of procedure there is a basic question whether
the rehearing provisions effectively curtail inappropriate confinement.
It is not unusual for a public defender to contact an individual whose
conservatorship is up for renewal and discover that the conservatee has
been dissatisfied with conservatorship for many months. Although the
any relative or friend of the conservatee may apply by verified petition to the superior
court of the county in which the proceedings are pending to have the conservatorship
terminated." CAL. PROB. CODE § 1755 (West Supp. 1977). A jury trial may be sought
and the conservatorship terminated if the court or jury determines that it is no longer
necessary. Id.
110. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5364 (West Supp. 1977).
111. 59 Cal. App. 3d 522, 130 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1976).
112. Id. at 558, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
113. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 905, § 5, at 3.
114. Id.
115. Heinreid v. Superior Ct., 59 Cal. App. 3d 552, 557, 130 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1976).
116. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 905, § 5, at 3.
117. Id.
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act requires prominent posting within institutions of the right to habeas
corpus, to a jury trial, and patients' civil rights, 1 8 there is presently no
provision for notice to conservatees of the right to a rehearing. Pro-
cedures should be developed to guarantee that conservatees are notified
periodically of this right.
Even with knowledge of the availability of rehearing, the legisla-
tive assumption that inappropriate confinement will be actively resisted
by the conservatee or his conservator may be unrealistic. The vast ma-
jority of those under conservatorship have a public agency serving as
conservator."' Such agencies rarely receive enough staffing, at least
in large counties, to allow the conservatorship officers to know their
wards on the basis of more than a dozen brief meetings a year, if
that.12 0  While these conservators generally respond to a doctor's
recommendation that restrictions be terminated, they lack the time to
investigate independently the propriety of further confinement.
Reliance on the patient's initiative to warn officials of improper
confinement also clashes with institutional realities. Placing the bur-
den of identifying improper confinement on the conservatee, rather
than the committing authority, assumes a depth of self-actualization
often inconsistent with institutional existence. Laymen often perceive
the psychiatric institution as a setting in which people heal and grow
stronger. While this ideal is sometimes achieved, many patients in-
stead adjust to the hospital setting (with resulting loss of work and
social skills) and begin to identify with the "sick" hospital commu-
nity.121  Moreover, it is often in the interest of an overburdened psy-
chiatrist to keep the patient "cooperative" and thus resigned to his
placement in a mental hospital.
For all patients, but particularly those with a promising prognosis,
there is a need for protective measures to deter unnecessary confine-
ment. That protection should be augmented by shifting responsibility
for minimizing inappropriate detention from the conservatees to the
committing system. For example, at the conservatorship hearing, testi-
118. CAL. WELF. & INsr. CODE § 5325 (West Supp. 1977).
119. Citizens Advisory Council, Mental Health Advisory Board Project, Report of
Aug. 10, 1976, Comparative Chart by County, of Statistics Regarding Conservatorship
and Staff (on file with the authors). This chart discloses that the percentage of LPS
conservatees who have a public guardian or other public agency serving as conservator
ranges from a low of 65% in San Joaquin County to 100% in five different counties.
In Santa Clara County, 90% of those under conservatorship have a public guardian.
120. Id. The comparative chart shows, for example, an average caseload of 100
conservatees per guardian in Sonoma and San Bernardino counties, 200 per guardian in
San Joaquin County, and 220 per guardian in Santa Clara County.
121. R. PRICE & B. DENNER, THE MAKING OF A MENTAL PATIENT 278-79 (1973).
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mony could be taken and a finding made as to the length of time hospi-
talization is required. When that period expires, the conservatee
should be discharged, unless the staff can show cause at a hearing for
that purpose why confinement should be extended.
122
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5353, the awesome
power to institutionalize has been turned over to the conservators, who
may defer actively or by oversight to the opinion of the psychiatrist.
In the absence of effective measures to preclude inappropriate confine-
ment, mental health law goes full circle, placing hospitalization back
in the hands of the hospital authorities. The present rehearing provi-
sion, even coupled with the ever present right of habeas corpus, does
not operate to foreclose this lamentable prospect.
Conclusion
In so far as LPS has increased legal and judicial involvement in
the civil commitment structure it has furthered its announced goals.
12 3
Indeed, the intensified involvement of patient advocates has produced
benefits beyond those expressly sought by the drafters of the act. We
noted, for example, that advocates often occupy the mediating position
of an ombudsman, and that they can thereby perform a significant
therapeutic function. Contact between lawyers and treating physicians
can work to prompt further screening of patients, and even to generate
modification of confinement conditions.
LPS has failed, however, where it has limited the impact of
legal safeguards. In some areas, the failure has been through legis-
lative omission, such as the failure to allow a right to counsel dur-
ing the seventy-two hour hold. In other areas LPS fails because of
vague or inadequate definitions or protections. The inadequacy of the
test for determining grave disability falls under this category. While
the approach of the act may have been born of the compromises neces-
sary for initial reform, LPS has moved beyond infancy. As LPS ap-
proaches the end of its first decade, it is time for legislative and judicial
reexamination of an act which affects the lives and freedom of
thousands of Californians.
122. Under present law, if the facility determines that a conservatee no longer
needs the care or treatment of the facility, the conservator is under a qualified duty to
find alternative placement. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5359 (West 1972).
Reliance on the facility, however, to terminate sua sponte all inappropriate confinement
of conservatees compromises one of the basic premises of the act: that mental health
professionals should not be the ultimate or only decisionmakers regarding the liberty of
the mentally ill.
123. See note 26 supra.
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